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It seems to be impossible for a person to have introspective access to thoughts that are not her own (Campbell 1999). Yet, although 
first-personal conscious awareness of a particular 
thought is normally sufficient for being its owner, 
some schizophrenic subjects report being con-
scious of thoughts that are not theirs. This sug-
gests that, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, 
thought ownership is not a necessary condition 
for consciously experiencing a thought. Because 
what schizophrenics report is thus rather difficult 
to reconcile with standard philosophical concep-
tions of conscious thought, it would be good to 
have a clearer picture of precisely how experiences 
of thought insertion differ from those of ordinary 
thinking. Developing such a picture is the aim of 
Patrizia Pedrini’s essay.
Dispositions and Agency
One of Pedrini’s most valuable insights is that 
ordinary thinking is intimately tied to cognitive 
agency. Correspondingly, she thinks that expe-
riences of thought insertion arise because of a 
certain type of agential failure. Although appeals 
to agency are familiar in discussions of thought 
insertion, the relevant failures have traditionally 
been conceived of primarily in volitional terms, 
either as some impairment in a subject’s ability to 
generate her thoughts or as some missing sense of 
agency normally associated with this kind of act. 
Yet, as several theorists have pointed out, many 
ordinary thoughts, such as passing thoughts or 
free associations, also lack these features. So, if 
cognitive agency is uniquely impaired in cases of 
thought insertion, it must be in some other way.
Pedrini’s conception of agency is importantly 
different. Rather than characterizing it in terms 
of acts or volitions, she offers a dispositional 
conception and develops her account of thought 
insertion along these lines. According to Pedrini 
(2015), we are fundamentally cognitive agents 
and being such is a “condition of possibility of 
holding attitudes held as our own” (p. 225). More 
specifically, she claims that one must be a cognitive 
agent to experience a particular thought as one’s 
own. This, however, does not require one to have 
actively formed the thought; rather it requires only 
that a person “be willing to take responsibility” 
for a thought and to actually do so “when (and if) 
the appropriate occasion arises” (p. 225). Thus, 
cognitive agency as it figures in Pedrini’s account 
should be understood as the disposition to ‘take 
responsibility’ for one’s thoughts.
But what does this involve? Among contempo-
rary philosophers it is common to think a subject 
takes responsibility by endorsing her thoughts or 
judging them to be supported by reasons (Moran 
2001). This line of thinking is embodied in what 
Pedrini calls the Endorsement Model. According 
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to endorsement theorists, a normal subject experi-
ences a thought as her own because she has the ca-
pacity to endorse it with reasons (see, for example, 
Fernandez [2010] and Pickard [2010]). Pedrini’s 
central criticism of this model strikes me as cor-
rect. Schizophrenics typically experience thought 
insertion with respect to a variety of attitudes, not 
simply rational ones. Thus, they are sometimes 
alienated from thought contents that they merely 
entertain, fancy, or attend to. It should be clear, 
however, that for modes of thinking like these the 
notion of rational endorsement is completely out 
of place. Indeed, it is hard to see what it could 
mean to judge that my entertaining a thought 
about the beach is supported by reasons. How 
could merely entertaining such an idea have or 
lack justification? At best, the Endorsement Model 
is applicable to rational attitudes, like beliefs or 
desires, but not to the kinds of thoughts that, 
as Pedrini (2015) says, “do not have a rational 
provenance” (p. 225).
Is there some way to understand the notion of 
“taking responsibility” more broadly? If we look 
to social interactions, it seems that, in addition 
to citing reasons for our thoughts, we often cite 
causes. For example, if I am entertaining a thought 
about the beach and you were to ask why, I might 
reply that I am especially tired. In such a case, my 
fatigue would be cited as the cause of my think-
ing, not a reason. Because these sorts of causal 
explanations are as prevalent as rational ones, 
Pedrini proposes that we “take responsibility” 
for our thoughts in virtue of being disposed to 
engage in what she calls the “cause/reason-giving 
practice.” We are responsible in the sense that 
we are inclined to explain what we are thinking, 
sometimes by giving reasons and sometimes by 
quoting “the causes of our attitudes, instead of 
their reasons” (p. 225).
There is much about Pedrini’s general picture 
of cognition that I find illuminating. Her disposi-
tional conception allows us to see how agency can 
be connected to those parts of our mental lives that 
were not, or could not, be formed as the outcome 
of deliberation. Additionally, by emphasizing our 
dispositions to give causal, non-reason giving, 
explanations, Pedrini demonstrates how we can 
be agents with respect to non-rational attitudes. 
This basic framework is extremely appealing 
and I think it recommends novel approaches for 
thinking about several philosophical problems. 
Nevertheless, I am not fully convinced by Pedrini’s 
use of it to explain thought insertion.
Explaining Inserted Thoughts
Pedrini wants to explain thought insertion on 
the basis of impaired agency, where this is under-
stood in terms of dispositions to give rational or 
causal explanations for thoughts. She writes, “if 
the occurrence of [an] attitude is not accompanied 
by the dispositions to act upon it in the ‘cause/
reason-giving practice’ on appropriate occasions, 
the attitude is experienced as alien” (p. 227). So, 
on her view, if a subject is not disposed to explain 
a particular thought, she will experience it as alien.
Prima facie, it is not implausible to think 
subjects have a general disposition to participate 
in the cause/reason-giving practice. This is typi-
cally how we envision dispositions to engage in 
practices that range over infinite domains. For 
instance, most of us are disposed to calculate sums 
whenever someone asks us to add two numbers. 
Most plausibly, we have a general disposition to 
calculate sums rather than a massive aggregation 
of distinct dispositions; that is, a disposition to add 
1 + 1, one to add 1 + 2, one to add 1 + 3, and so 
on. Yet it seems that this is not how Pedrini thinks 
of explanatory dispositions. She often speaks of a 
subject failing to ‘acquire’ a disposition to engage 
in the cause/reason-giving practice with respect to 
a specific ‘piece of thinking,’ and this suggests that 
she believes subjects normally have a conglomera-
tion of discrete explanatory dispositions, one for 
each thought.
In that case, however, it is much less clear 
whether ordinary subjects really do acquire this 
type of disposition for every single thought. In-
deed, it seems to me that I sometimes have pass-
ing thoughts or daydreams that I am not at all 
disposed to explain; however, I am not thereby 
alienated from them. Pedrini will want to insist 
that, unlike the schizophrenic, I do have the rel-
evant disposition but simply fail to manifest it on 
certain occasions. But, if explanatory dispositions 
are acquired on a case-by-case basis, it is hard to 
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see what grounds she could have for this insistence. 
If you were to ask me to add 87 and 49 and I 
were not inclined to answer, it might be reason-
able to say I am nevertheless disposed to calculate 
the sum; but this is because it is independently 
plausible that I am generally disposed to calculate 
sums. Without that sort of general disposition, it 
is difficult to see what reason there would be to 
maintain that I have the disposition to calculate 
this particular sum. Similarly, if we follow Pedrini 
in thinking that a discrete disposition is connected 
to each episode of thinking, it will be nearly im-
possible to distinguish cases where a disposition 
fails to manifest itself from cases where it is simply 
absent. Pedrini needs some criteria for making this 
distinction, especially if the latter are supposed to 
explain experiences of alienation.
My larger worry with Pedrini’s account is 
that it looks to me like schizophrenic subjects 
are disposed to give causal explanations for their 
thoughts. Because they generally explain thoughts 
like we do, they seem to understand the cause/
reason-giving practice perfectly well. Thus, if we 
look at first-hand reports, it is natural to think that 
schizophrenics are offering causal explanations 
for inserted thoughts. Subjects typically say things 
like “the thought was given to me electrically” 
(Mullins and Spence 2003, 295) or “the houses 
had put them in my head” (Saks 2007, 27). These 
are causal explanations. So why is a report of 
thought insertion not a manifestation of the dis-
position to participate in the cause/reason-giving 
practice, a disposition Pedrini claims is sufficient 
for experiencing a thought as one’s own? I think 
Pedrini (2015) attempts to address this question 
in the following passage:
The alienated thought lacks the agentive dispositions 
to enter the practice non deliriously, but then the subject, 
who attempts to make sense of her abnormal experi-
ence and whose global agentive capacity in thought are 
not impaired, makes an extreme move to enter into the 
practice: she introduces among the legitimate causes 
that explain why she has a certain perplexingly alien 
thought the possibility that another person can actually 
be thinking that thought in her place. (p. 229–30)
This passage is perplexing. Pedrini begins by claim-
ing the subject of an “alienated thought” lacks the 
relevant “agentive disposition,” but she then says 
the subject has an unimpaired “global agentive 
capacity to enter into the practice.” However, if 
the subject is “globally” disposed to explain her 
thoughts, then she is disposed to participate in 
the practice simpliciter. Any “local” disposition 
is redundant.
Perhaps Pedrini could appeal to the notion 
of ‘appropriateness.’ She might argue that a de-
lusional explanation is inappropriate given the 
norms of the cause/reason-giving practice, so much 
so that offering one amounts to disengaging from 
that practice. But why do these explanations dis-
qualify someone from making a move in the cause/
reason-giving game? They are obviously highly 
irregular and they may even violate some kind of 
norms, for example epistemic norms governing 
the selection of a candidate hypothesis. Yet that 
does not unambiguously demonstrate the absence 
of a disposition to participate in the practice. 
Malapropisms, for example, show us how some-
one can be disposed to speak a natural language 
while nevertheless violating a norm on occasion. 
Is a delusional explanation that invokes inserted 
thoughts significantly different in some way? One 
might be tempted to think the key difference has to 
do with the fact that schizophrenics cite external 
causes rather than internal ones but that would 
be difficult to reconcile with what Pedrini says 
about the kinds of causal explanations we tend to 
give for our sensations or brute desires, which we 
obviously do not experience as alien.
Furthermore, offering bizarre causal explana-
tions is characteristic of most schizophrenic delu-
sions. For instance, one schizophrenic individual 
reported thinking he was a robot and that strang-
ers nearly always recognized him. His explana-
tion for this thought was that he was “in fact the 
subject of some kind of experiment designed to 
cure me from being so predictable” (Timlett 2013, 
245). Another claimed he felt distress because his 
neighbors were “broadcasting their voices using 
black magic” (Freeman et al. 2004). It is typical 
for delusional explanations to be highly abnormal 
and idiosyncratic like these, but they nonethe-
less exhibit the structure of causal explanation. 
Notice, however, that on Pedrini’s view these 
explanations would have to be consistent with 
participation in the cause/reason-giving practice 
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because their subjects do not experience alien-
ation. But if explanations like these can manifest, 
or at least be compatible with, a disposition to 
engage in that practice, why would explanations 
invoking inserted thoughts be disqualified? It is 
hard to imagine an answer to this question that 
is not ad hoc.
Throughout her essay, Pedrini urges us to con-
centrate on what is lost in experiences of thought 
insertion rather than on what she calls the ‘de-
lirious’ attributions associated with those experi-
ences. But, I think it is rather likely that the two are 
closely connected. A substantive characterization 
of thought insertion might focus more on the rela-
tionship between the way in which a schizophrenic 
subject tries to describe her experiences and what 
those experiences are subjectively like. Perhaps an 
experience of thought insertion consists of some 
kind of impaired introspective access to one’s own 
thoughts and a subject’s delusional explanation is 
her attempt to characterize the nature of this im-
pairment. Although this not the forum to pursue 
this line of thinking, it offers a way in which the 
phenomenon could be broadly consistent with our 
philosophical intuitions about introspection. But, 
more important, approaching the phenomenon 
from this angle could result in something Pedrini 
rightly values, a better understanding of what it is 
like for someone to experience thought insertion.
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